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Abstract 
 
Medical errors are a major source of healthcare costs, and are estimated to result into the deaths of 
hundreds of people in the Netherlands annually. Over the past twenty year, the safety culture and 
learning capacity of healthcare institutions has received considerable attention in explaining why 
medical errors remain underreported undiscussed, which in turn frustrates learning. In the 
Netherlands, medication incidents can be reported to the CMR. However, as of yet, no accurate 
instrument exists to measure medication safety culture, and no study of the proportion of medication 
incidents that get reported to the CMR has been conducted. Method: In order to measure medication 
safety culture, we developed the Medication Safety Culture Questionnaire (MSCQ). We tested the 
psychometric properties of the MSCQ on a sample of Dutch healthcare professionals (n=97). We also 
used the MSCQ score as a predictor for the incidents reported to the CMR. Results: The MSCQ showed 
good internal consistency. Confirmative Factor analysis was unable to confirm the factor structure of 
the MSCQ. The MSCQ was unable to accurately predict reporting behavior to the CMR. Our research 
has found many medication incidents remain underreported. Implications: Reporting of medication 
incidents can be much improved on in the Netherlands. Our research shows the need for a reliable 
instrument for measuring medication safety culture.  
 
  
 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Safety Culture 
Medical errors are a major source of healthcare costs, and cause significant levels of health damage. A 
recent study estimates that medical errors may account for as much as 10% of all deaths due to illness 
in the United States, which would rank medical errors as the third cause of death, after cancer and 
heart disease (Makary & Daniel, 2016). In the Netherlands, the number of deaths due to medical errors 
is estimated at 1735 anually (Leistikow, 2010). Even so, medical errors generally remain 
underreported. Reasons why medical errors may not get reported include occupational pride, fear of 
adverse consequences such as litigation or obstruction in career advancement, or the lack of adequate 
reporting systems (Castel et al., 2015).   
  Recently, the safety culture of healthcare institutions has received considerable attention in 
explaining why medical errors remain underreported. Safety culture approaches were originally 
developed in high-risk industries such as aviation, but interest in safety culture in healthcare has taken 
flight ever since the publication of the report To Err is Human by the U.S. Institute of Medicine. The 
authors of To Err is Human stress the importance of an adequate safety culture to patient safety, and 
call for the systematic review of the causes of incidents to improve patient safety. The work by Kohn, 
Corrigan, & Donaldson (2000) has inspired a vast body of literature on safety culture in healthcare 
(Stelfox, Palmisani, Scurlock, Orav, & Bates, 2006). An adequate safety culture in healthcare 
institutions is generally considered to require an agreement on all organizational levels that safety is 
important, a commitment to promote safety which is shared by all employees, good communication 
between employees, and to have adequate safety procedures in place (Kirk et al., 2007).   
  A contentious aspect of safety culture is the extent to which people should be held personally 
accountable for incidents and errors. In the early days of safety culture research in healthcare, it was 
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widely believed that there was a strong culture of blaming individuals for incidents. Because such a 
“culture of blame” might detract from addressing systematic issues and implementing changes, it is 
widely held hat changing the culture of blame should be one of the priorities in fostering a better safety 
culture in healthcare (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). In line with these views, Khatri, Brown & 
Hicks (2009) use the term “blame culture” to qualify healthcare organizations that have a very 
hierarchical structure, personal responsibility for incidents is dodged, and in which blame is shifted 
towards individuals instead of addressing systematic problems. They oppose blame culture to a “just 
culture”, in which there can be open dialogue concerning safety issues, facilitating safer practices. If 
we are to believe Khatri and colleagues, pinning blame for incidents on individuals is always 
detrimental to safety culture. Following this logic, they overestimate the influence of an open and 
conciliatory management style in fostering an adequate safety culture. Inversely, the assumption that 
a strong hierarchy is always detrimental to safety culture is problematic (Khatri, Brown & Hicks, 2009). 
There is no compelling reason to assume this always and necessarily is the case, provided that 
hierarchical concerns are not allowed to trump safety standards and concerns within organizations.
   Walton (2004) has warned for the dangers of focusing exclusively on the role of 
systematic errors when analyzing adverse outcomes. If this comes at the expense of looking for 
individual factors, this may lead professional duties and responsibilities to be neglected. It seems that 
an adequate safety culture should search for a middle ground, focusing both on systemic errors as well 
holding healthcare professionals responsible for the quality of their work (Wachter & Pronovost, 2009).  
  
1.2 Organizational Learning 
Closely related and essential to an adequate safety culture is the ability of organizations to learn from 
safety incidents. According to Levitt & March (1988), organizations qualify as learning when they 
encode inferences drawn from the past into routines, which subsequently guide future behavior. In 
the healthcare sector, in which patient safety is one of the highest priorities, analyzing safety incidents 
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should have the highest priority in organizational learning. It is only when healthcare institutions are 
able to learn from previous safety incidents that they can implement the necessary changes to prevent 
these from recurring. Drupsteen, Zwetsloot & Groeneweg (2013) propose a model, identifying four 
phases in organizational learning. In the first phase, incidents need to be identified, reported and 
analysed. Before an incident can be analysed it must be reported, which requires a reporting system. 
During the second phase, interventions should be planned and formulated in a realistic intervention 
plan. In the third phase the intervention plan is realized. Key to successful realization of any 
intervention is identifying the resources needed for the successful implementation of the intervention, 
and to communicate the action plan with all those involved in its implementation. In the fourth and 
final phase, the intervention and its impact on safety are evaluated.   
  The first phase of the model is arguably the most important of all, for it is only when a safety 
incident is reported that the other three phases become relevant. Unsurprisingly, the importance of 
adequate reporting systems is consistently emphasized in literature on safety culture (Macrae & 
Vincent, 2014). When it comes to reporting, it is important to have the right reporting culture. It is 
often assumed that a culture of blame reduces the likelihood of employees reporting safety incidents 
(Khatri, Brown & Hicks, 2009). Even so, research suggests that there are other factors of influence on 
reporting behavior, including attitudes among healthcare professionals on the top-down regulation of 
healthcare provision, and aversion towards bureaucratic paperwork. As Justin Waring sees it, “the 
promotion of incident reporting must engage with more than the ubiquitous ‘culture of blame’ and 
instead address the ‘culture of medicine’” (Waring, 2005, p. 1927). Additionally, it is important for 
employees to feel that something will actually be done with their reports (Castel et al., 2015). It is 
therefore not enough for healthcare institutions to possess adequate reporting systems; it is equally 
important for healthcare professionals to feel comfortable using these systems, which requires 
reporting systems to be an integral part of an institution’s safety culture, and personnel to be trained 
in using them.   
  In recent years, Dutch hospitals have made great improvements when it comes to learning 
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from incidents. Drawing inspiration from high-risk industries, many Dutch hospitals have implemented 
safety management systems to learn from incidents and to improve patient safety. Even so, learning 
behavior could stand to be improved by further cultivating safety culture (Gallis et al., 2010).  
  
1.3 Medication Safety in the Netherlands 
A major source of medical errors pertains to the prescription, application, and monitoring of 
medication. Put together, medication incidents are the largest source of medical errors (Garrouste-
Orgeas et al., 2012). A study has found that approximately 5,6% of all unplanned hospital admissions 
in the Netherlands can be attributed to medication incidents, almost half of which are at least 
potentially preventable (Leendertse et al., 2008). Considering the significant costs of medication 
incidents, it may come as no surprise that the reduction of these incidents is a top priority for 
healthcare providers in the Netherlands. In 2007, the Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (IVG; 
Inspection for Public Health; part of the Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Sport, and Welfare) asked a 
committee of experts to come up with a concrete action plan to improve in medication and patient 
safety. Some of the key recommendations of the report are to monitor the safety culture of healthcare 
professionals, and to support a nationwide reporting system for medication incidents (Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2009).  
  Such a nationwide reporting system had been launched in 2006. The so-called Central 
Medication-Incident Registration (CMR) allows pharmacists and healthcare professionals to file 
medication incidents in a central database, which can then be consulted by other healthcare providers 
(Cheung, 2015a). Filing incidents is voluntary for healthcare professionals and institutions, but it is one 
of the quality indicators on the basis of which pharmacies are evaluated. In 2014, 19.252 medication 
incidents were reported to the CMR, 16.838 of which by hospitals (CMR, 2015). The CMR utilizes three 
criteria to identify medication incidents that are worth reporting. First of all, the likelihood of the 
incident recurring must be high. Secondly, the incident must have instructional value for other 
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healthcare professionals. Finally, there has to be at least potential damage to the health of patients 
(Cheung, 2015a). However useful the CMR may be, the mere reporting of medication of incidents will 
not significantly reduce incidents, if incidents are not systematically studied and improvements 
implemented (Castel et al., 2015). That is, the CMR can only be expected to function properly if 
healthcare institutions and healthcare professional have adopted an adequate safety culture, in which 
the reporting and analyzing of incidents plays a central role. Moreover, healthcare professionals will 
need to receive proper instruction in order to make reports that can be of future use.   
  In a recent publication, the IVG called for the improvement of prescription safety across the 
entire Dutch healthcare sector. However, the report focusses exclusively on procedures to prevent 
medication incidents from occurring in, and makes no mention of the CMR, or the importance of 
reporting and evaluating medication incidents once they have occurred (IVG, 2016). In an evaluation 
of the CMR, Cheung (2015b) has found that the quantity and quality of filings in the CMR vary greatly 
between healthcare institutions. His main recommendation to improve the efficacy of the CMR is to 
foster the right reporting culture in healthcare institutions. Cheung believes that the IVG could play an 
important role in promoting safety culture, by including it in their visitations and evaluations of 
healthcare institutions (Cheung, 2015b). However, as of yet no study has been conducted in the 
Netherlands investigating the influence of safety culture on the prevalence of medication incidents, 
and the proportion of incidents that are reported to the CMR.   
  
1.4 Measuring Safety Culture and Medication Safety 
What has long frustrated empirical studies of safety culture and its relation to medical errors is the 
lack of accurate measuring instruments for safety culture of health care institutions. The recognition 
of the importance of safety culture to patient safety has led to an increased call for such instruments, 
capable of reliably measuring safety culture in health care institutions (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). At first, 
these safety culture measures were directly adopted from other high-risk industries. Because these 
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tools were not designed to measure safety culture in health care settings, the psychometric properties 
and construct validity of these measures were by and large unsatisfactory (Flin, 2007). 
 Improvements have been made in recent years, as more and more assessment tools designed 
exclusively for use in health care institutions have become available. The most widely used of these 
instruments is the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (S-HSOPSC), developed by the USA Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality. The S-HSOPSC has been translated and validated for use in 
healthcare institutions in many countries, including the Netherlands (Smits, Christiaans-Dingelhoff, 
Wagner, van der Wal, & Groenewegen, 2008), Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013), and Turkey (Bodur, & 
Filiz, 2010). Interestingly, attempts to validate the S-HSOPSC in the United Kingdom (Waterson, 
Griffiths, Stride, Murphy, & Hignett, 2010) and Taiwan (Chen & Li, 2010) proved less successful, 
suggesting that cultural factors and differences in institutional frameworks have an influence on safety 
culture as well.  
  Notwithstanding the advances when it comes to measuring safety culture in healthcare, the 
situation for medication safety still remains somewhat bleak. As of yet, no measuring instrument exists 
to accurately measure medication safety culture. Most safety culture questionnaires, including the 
aforementioned S-HSOPSC, do not refer specifically to medication safety. Even so, in some health care 
settings such as pharmacies, medication is at the core of health care service provision. Moreover, 
safety culture questionnaires that are specifically geared towards medication safety may help make 
sense of incidents involving medication. One of the things frustrating further advances in medication 
safety in the Netherlands is the fact that the effects of measures and interventions are not structurally 
measured (Lambooij, Molema, Limburg, & Weda, 2014). It seems therefore that a reliable instrument 
for measuring medication safety culture is much needed, all the more when we take into account that 
medication incidents form the largest category of medical errors, both in the Netherlands as well as 
globally.  
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1.5 The Medical Safety Culture Questionnaire (MSCQ)  
In order to measure the medication safety culture of healthcare institutions, we have developed the 
Medication Safety Culture Questionnaire (MSCQ). The MSCQ contains nine subscales which were 
identified based on a literature study of safety culture, organizational learning, and medication safety. 
On the basis of our literature study, we have identified the following subscales for the MSCQ: 
Management: Management is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of healthcare 
institutions. This includes facilitating cooperation and contact between employees. It is often 
assumed that a hierarchical management style and close supervision of employees is 
detrimental to safety culture (Khatri, Brown & Hicks, 2009). Management is also responsible 
for monitoring the quality of care delivered, as well as for the implementation of new 
procedures, including safety procedures, reporting systems, and monitoring programs. 
Finally, management also has the authority to punish digressions and errors. Many authors 
claim that when management severely punishes mishaps, people are less likely to report and 
discuss incidents, which in turn is detrimental to safety culture (Castel et al., 2015). 
Reporting: In order for incidents to be reported, it is important for healthcare institutions to 
inform their employees of the importance of reporting incidents, and to stimulate them to do 
so (Benn et al., 2009). 
Openness: The extent to which information is shared within a team or department in the 
case of a medication incident, and the degree to which such incidents are discussed openly 
(Sutcliffe, Lori & Pronovost, 2017). 
Speaking Up: For people to voice concerns about safety, it is important for them to feel like 
their input is valued. For this it is important that people feel that voicing their concerns will 
not personally affect them negatively, and that something will be done with their concerns 
(Hutchinson et al., 2009).  
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Fairness: Discussing and reporting incidents is severely impeded when employees feel that 
they may not be treated fairly. It is therefore important for healthcare professional to feel 
they will be treated fairly when they report a safety incident (Gabriel, 2015). 
Fear/Trust: It is important for an adequate safety culture that employees can trust each 
other, and feel they can commit mistakes. Inversely, when people fear the consequences of 
potential mistakes, this is often regarded as detrimental to safety culture (Elmqvist, Rigaudy, 
& Vink, 2016). 
Person/System: In order for organizations to learn from and adequately analyze incidents, it 
is important they view incidents as resulting primarily from flaws in procedures and safety 
systems. Such a system approach is often contrasted with a person approach, in which the 
cause and blame for incidents is pinned primarily on individuals. There is general agreement 
among safety experts that a system approach is preferable over a person approach when it 
comes to fostering an adequate safety culture (Gabriel, 2015). 
Committed to Safety: For an adequate safety culture, it is important that all employees 
recognize the importance of safety, and are committed to ensuring safety (Boysen, 2013).  
Learning: Incidents offer opportunities for organizational learning. To this end, it is important 
that incidents are analyzed appropriately, and translated into concrete and implementable 
improvements (Vincent, 2007). 
A short description and operationalization of every subscale can be found in the methods section. The 
entire questionnaire can be found under appendix A. Based on the answers to the MSCQ, the 
Medication Safety Score is calculated. The aim of the MSCQ is to provide healthcare professionals, 
policy advisors, and healthcare managers with a reliable instrument to measure medication safety 
culture, and to identify areas for potential improvements. Image 1.1 offers a graphical representation 
of the MSCQ and its subscales.  
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Image 1.1  
The MSCQ & subscales 
 
   
We have also devised a five-question checklist that can be used to assess the knowledge healthcare 
professionals have of the CMR. The aim of the CMR Checklist is to provide healthcare institutions with 
a short and easy to use tool to see whether their employees possess sufficient knowledge of the CMR 
and reporting procedures to effectively report medication incidents. We will also test whether the 
CMR is a strong predictor of the Medication Safety Score. Should this be the case, the CMR Checklist 
might provide a short and efficient measure of medication safety culture, as a substitute for the entire 
questionnaire.  
  
1.6 Present Study 
In the present study, we will investigate the psychometric properties of the MSCQ. We have included 
the MSCQ in a survey among Dutch healthcare professionals that work with medication. We have also 
Management 
Committed to 
safety 
Person / 
System 
Fear / Trust 
Reporting 
Learning 
Honesty / 
Justice 
Openness 
Speaking up 
Medication 
Safety Culture 
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included the CMR Checklist, as well as questions about people’s knowledge of and experience with the 
CMR, including their reporting behavior. The aim of these questions is to ascertain what proportion of 
medication incidents get reported to the CMR, and the extent to which people know of the CMR. 
Finally, we will investigate whether the Medication Safety Score obtained through the MSCQ can 
predict how many incidents get reported to the CMR. This will offer both further validation for the 
MSCQ, as well as providing valuable insight on the functioning of the CMR.  
  In this study, we will test the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: the overall internal consistency of the MSCQ is high (Cronbach’s α>.80).  
Hypothesis 2: the internal consistency of the individual scales of the MSCQ is high (α>.70).  
Hypothesis 3: the MSCQ is a conceptually valid predictor of medication safety culture, as confirmed  
by fit indices in a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (RMSEA < .010; CFI > .95).   
Hypothesis 4: The Medication Safety Score obtained through the MSCQ is a predictor of the number 
of incidents reported to the CMR, for both the number of individual reports as well as for teams/ 
departments as a whole (β≥.60).  
Hypothesis 5: The CMR Checklist score is a predictor of the number of incidents reported to the CMR , 
for both the number of individual reports as well as for teams/ departments as a whole (β≥.60).  
Hypothesis 6: The CMR Checklist score is a predictor for the Medication Safety Score obtained with 
the MSCQ (β≥.50). 
Hypothesis 7: Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants have a significantly higher Medication Safety Score 
and score significantly higher on the CMR Checklist than other healthcare professionals (α=0.05).  
Hypothesis 8: Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants report significantly more incidents to the CMR 
than other healthcare professionals, for both the number of individual reports as well as for teams/ 
departments as a whole (α<.05).  
 
 2 Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
All healthcare professionals that work with medication (including prescription, application, and/or 
monitoring) in the Netherlands and that are affluent in Dutch could participate in our research. 
Participants were recruited using social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. In addition, we 
asked various healthcare institutions to help us find respondents, including pharmacies. Participants 
were sent a cover letter including information about the research, an informed consent, and a link to 
our survey on the online survey platform Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2005). Participants were also informed 
that they could participate in a raffle by filling in their email address, in which they had a chance to win 
€20,- in store credit for the largest online retailer of the Netherlands, Bol.com.   
  In total, 97 participants filled in our survey. All participants completed the entire questionnaire. 
Of our 97 participants, 81 were female (83.5%) and 16 were male (16.5%). The average age of 
respondents was 38.4 years (σ=13), with an average of 16.1 years of working experience as a 
healthcare professional (σ=11.7). Table 1.1 shows the current job function of our respondents, and 
table 1.2 their educational attainment. 
 
Table 1.1  
Current job function 
 n % 
 Nurse 44 45.4% 
Caretaker 29 29.9% 
Pharmacist 10 10.3% 
Physician 3 3.1% 
Medical Intern 2 2.1% 
Physician assistant 1 1% 
Pharmacy assistant 1 1% 
Other 7 7.2% 
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Table 1.2  
Educational attainment 
 n % 
 HBO Nursing 24 24.7% 
MBO Nursing 23 23.7% 
WO Pharmacy 10 10.3% 
WO Medicine 4 4.1% 
MBO Pharmacy Assistant 1 1% 
Still uncompleted 
     HBO 
     MBO 
     WO 
13 
6 
5 
1 
13.4% 
6.2% 
5.2% 
5.2% 
Other  
      MBO 
      WO/WO+ 
      HBO/HBO+ 
22 
17 
1 
1 
22.7% 
17.5% 
1% 
1% 
 
 
 
2.2 Materials 
Our survey included a section with an informed consent and information about our study, followed by 
questions on personal information including age, gender, education, working experience, and current 
job function. The second part of our survey consisted of questions asking people about their 
experiences with medication incidents, as well as the amount of incidents they had reported to the 
CMR. These questions were asked both for personally experienced medication incidents, as well as for 
their department or team as whole. Subsequently, people were presented with the CMR Checklist, a 
five-item questionnaire rated on a five point Likert scale (See Appendix A). The MSCQ formed the third 
part of our survey. The MSCQ consists of 45 items, containing a statement (see Appendix A). 
Respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with each statement on 
a five-point Likert scale, ranging from agree completely to disagree completely. The questions of the 
MSCQ are divided over the following nine subscales: 
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Management: Experienced style of the management and leadership within a 
team/department. Low scores on this scale are associated with strong hierarchy, strict 
procedures, and close supervision by superiors. (6 questions). 
Reporting: The extent to which the culture within a team/department stimulates the 
reporting of medication incidents . (5 questions). 
Openness: The extent to which information is shared within a team/department in the case 
of an incident, and the degree to which such incidents are discussed openly. (4 questions). 
Speaking Up: The extent to which people within a team/department are stimulated to make 
suggestions for the improvement of procedures and medication safety. (4 questions). 
Fairness: The extent to which people are treated fairly in case of a medication incident or 
when reporting a medication incident. (3 questions). 
Fear/Trust: The extent to which people within a team/department support each other in 
their work, and the degree to which people feel they can commit mistakes. (6 questions). 
Person/System: The extent to which people within a team/department are focusing on the 
unsafe acts of the people concerned instead of looking for the cause in the defensibility of 
the system and/or procedures. (9 questions). 
Committed to Safety: The extent to which a team/department is committed to improving 
patient safety. (4 questions). 
Learning: The extent to which incidents are analyzed and improvements are implemented 
within a team/department. (4 questions). 
2.3 Procedure 
The online survey was active during March and April of 2017. During this time, participants could follow 
a link to fill in our online survey. The entire survey took about twenty minutes to complete, and 
participants could pause at any time they pleased. After we had collected our data, we imported our 
dataset from Qualtrics to IBM SPSS Statistics 23, in order to conduct our statistical analyses. We 
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conducted our confirmatory factor analysis in R Studio using the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), after 
having imported our dataset from SPSS. 
  
 3 Results 
 
3.1 Missing Data 
None of the respondents failed to complete the entire questionnaire. Some respondents failed to 
answer every question, most likely because they continued to the next block of questions before 
having answered all the questions of the previous block. Overall, there were relatively few missing 
answers (less than 1%), and these did not seem to follow a systematic pattern. Therefore, we decided 
to fill in missing data using mean substitution (Little, Jorgensen, Lang, & Moore, 2013). 
 
3.2 Hypothesis 1 & 2: Testing Reliability 
To test the internal consistency of the MSCQ, we calculated the Cronbach’s alpha scores for the 
questionnaire as a whole, as well as for the individual subscales. Hypothesis one states that the internal 
consistency of the MSCQ is high (α>.80). The Cronbach’s alpha of the entire questionnaire is .885, thus 
confirming hypothesis one. Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of the individual scales. As the table 
shows, the overall Cronbach’s alpha diminishes by omitting all but the Management scale, and omitting 
the Management Scale would increase the overall alpha only marginally.  
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Table 2.1 
Item-Total Statistics & Cronbach's Alpha MSCQ 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Management 17.5560 21.260 .379 .395 .890 
Reporting 17.8804 19.356 .483 .403 .885 
Openness 18.1196 16.924 .723 .595 .865 
Speaking up 17.7278 18.239 .659 .520 .870 
Fairness 18.5285 17.548 .721 .637 .865 
Fear/ Trust 18.0225 18.613 .656 .613 .871 
Person/ System 17.7793 18.985 .671 .567 .870 
Comitted to Safety 18.1531 18.739 .670 .550 .870 
Learning 18.2615 17.301 .755 .658 .861 
 
Hypothesis two states that the Cronbach's alpha scores of the subscales are acceptable (α>.70). The 
Cronbach’s alpha scores for the individual scales can be found in table 2.2. As the table shows, 
hypothesis two holds for most scales, with two of the nine subscales scoring lower than .70. Of these, 
Reporting can still be said to have moderate reliability (5 items, α=.66). Only the Management subscale 
appears to perform poorly in terms of internal consistency (6 items, α=.17).   
 
Table 2.2  
Cronbach's Alpha subscales MSCQ 
Scale Cronbach's Alpha  # Items 
Management .167 6 
Reporting .660 5 
Openness .809 4 
Speaking up .706 4 
Fairness .790 3 
 Fear/ Trust .766 6 
 Person/ System .767 9 
Safety .728 4 
Learning .847 4 
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We also looked at the contribution of each individual item to the alpha score of its respective subscale. 
Where significant gains in reliability could be obtained, we looked at the item in question. If there were 
practical- or theoretical reasons to suspect that these questions could be inadequate, we decided to 
remove these from the scales of future versions of the MSCQ. On the basis of these criteria, we decided 
to delete seven items, and to move one item to a different scale. To differentiate the modified version 
of the MSCQ from the one we used in our survey, we shall henceforth refer to this version as the MSCQ-
2. The new overall Cronbach’s alpha score for the MSCQ-2 is .90. The Cronbach’s alpha scores for the 
subscales of the MSCQ-2 can be found in table 2.3. Of the scales of the MSCQ-2, the two scales 
Management and Reporting score marginally lower on internal consistency than what we deem to be 
desirable.   
 
Table 2.3  
Cronbach's Alpha MSCQ-2 and subscales 
Scale Cronbach's Alpha  Items deleted Items Added # Items 
MSCQ-2 overall 
Management 
.905 
.694 
 
Q25, Q28 
 
Q70 
38 
5 
Reporting .669 Q33  4 
Openness .809   4 
Speaking up .706 Q42  3 
Fairness .790   3 
Fear / Trust .827 Q55  5 
Person / System .800 Q59, Q60  7 
Comitted to Safety .763 Q70  3 
Learning .847   4 
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3.3 Hypothesis 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Before we conducted our Confirmative Factor Analysis (CFA), we checked whether the assumptions 
for CFA were met by our sample. These assumptions include a random sample, a sufficiently large 
sample size, and multivariate normality. Visual inspection led us to conclude that there is no indication 
that the assumption of multivariate normality is violated. Although there is considerable contention 
over the minimum acceptable sample size in CFA, a sample with n>200 is generally considered to be 
desirable (Hoyle, 2000). Following this rule of thumb, with 97 respondents, the size of our sample may 
prove too small to permit CFA. To check whether sample size is an issue in our case, we conducted the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, the results of which are shown in 
table 3.1. Because the value for the KMO with .817 was well above .50, and the Bartlett’s test of 
Sphericity highly significant (p<.000), we concluded that our sample does permit CFA. Figure 3.1 shows 
a graphical representation of the model we tested in our CFA.  
 
Table 3.1 
KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .817 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Approx. χ2 2657.487 
Df 990 
Sig. .000 
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Image 3.1 
The tested model: MSCQ & subscales
 
 
 
We conducted the CFA using the Lavaan package for R Studio (Rosseel, 2012). We conducted separate 
CFAs for the MSCQ and the MSCQ-2. The results of the CFAs can be found in table 3.2. Hypothesis three 
states that the MSCQ has a good model fit, as measured by fit indices (CFI>.95; RMSEA <.10). As we 
can see in Table 3.2, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed on the basis of our CFA. Although the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of .087 is acceptable for the MSCQ, the Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) of .703 is too low to confirm hypothesis three. Although the fit indices for MSCQ-2 are 
superior to that of the original MSCQ with an RMSEA of .089 and a CFI of .758, they are still insufficient 
to confirm hypothesis three.   
 
Table 3.2  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Model χ2  Df RMSEA CFI 
MSCQ 
MSCQ-2 
1569.648* 
1113.480* 
909 
629 
.087 
.089 
.703 
.758 
*p<o.oo1     
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3.4 Incident Reporting  
In the first block of our survey, we presented respondents with information about the CMR. This 
information was followed by a few questions about the number of medication incidents they had 
experienced, and the number of incidents they had reported to the CMR. We asked these questions 
both on a personal level (i.e., the number of incidents respondents had personally experienced and 
reported), as well as for their team or department as a whole (i.e., the number of incidents that had 
occurred in their team or department, as well as the number of incidents reported). Our respondents 
reported to have personally experienced an average of six medication incidents over the past five years 
(σ=4.3), while reporting on average 3.3 of these incidents (σ=4.1). On the level of their team or 
department, respondents reported that an average of 6.2 incidents had taken place over the last year 
(σ=4.2), three of which were reported (σ=4.2). This means that 55% of personally experienced 
medication incidents were reported to the CMR, and 48.4% of medication incidents within their team 
or department. Of our respondents, 45.7% indicated never to have reported a medication incident, 
while only 9.3% reported never to have experienced a medication incident. For teams or departments 
as a whole, these numbers were 54.3% and 14.4%, respectively.  
 
3.5 Hypotheses 4-6: Regression Analyses 
Hypothesis four states that the Medication Safety Score is a good predictor of the number of 
medication incidents reported to the CMR (β≥.60). To test this hypothesis, we conducted regression 
analyses for both the individual reporting of incidents as well as for that of teams. We first checked 
whether the assumptions for regression analysis were met. One of the assumptions is a linear relation 
between independent and dependent variables. Visual inspection of scatterplots showed that in the 
case for both individual as well as team reporting, this assumption is not met. Moreover, both variables 
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show considerable numbers of outliers (see graph 3.1). Because the assumption of a linear relation in 
both cases was not met, we decided not to continue with the regression analysis.  
           Hypothesis five states that the CMR Checklist is a good predictor of the number of incidents 
reported to the CMR (β≥.60). To test this hypothesis we planned to once again use regression analysis. 
However, visual inspection of the scatterplots again showed considerable outliers, and no clearly 
discernable linear trend. Consequently, we decided not to continue with the regression analysis.
   
Graph 3.1 
Distribution individual & team reports, Medication Safety score &CMR Checklist score 
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Hypothesis six states that the CMR Checklist is a predictor of the Medication Safety Score (β≥.50). We 
tested this hypothesis using regression analysis. Visual inspection of the scatterplot showed a linear 
relation between both variables, with no outliers. A significant regression equation was found 
(F(1,95)=28.342, p<.001), with an R2 of .23, and a β of .479. As can be seen in table 3.3, respondents 
predicted Medication Safety Score is equal to 14.027+.0479*CMR Checklist score. On the basis of our 
regression analysis, we must reject hypothesis six.  
 
Table 3.3 
Regression Analysis 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 
B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 14.027 1.246  11.254 .000   
CMR Checklist Score .455 .085 .479 5.324 .000   
a. Dependent Variable: Medication Safety Score 
 
 
3.6 Hypotheses 7 & 8: Pharmacists vs non-Pharmacists 
Hypothesis seven states that pharmacists and pharmacy assistants have a significantly higher 
Medication Safety Score and score significantly higher on the CMR Checklist than other healthcare 
professionals (α=0.05). Because the dependent variables in both cases do not display a normal 
distribution, we decided to conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The first test showed that pharmacists 
score significantly higher on the CMR Checklist (mean rank= 30.3) than non-pharmacists (mean rank= 
51.4, Z =2.35, p=0.019). The second test showed that pharmacists score significantly higher on the 
Medication Safety Score (Mean rank= 33.2) than non-pharmacists (Mean rank= 51, Z= -1.98, p=0.048). 
On the basis of these tests, we are able to confirm hypothesis seven.  
  Hypothesis eight states that Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants report significantly more 
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incidents to the CMR than other healthcare professionals, both for individual reports as well as for 
teams/departments (α<.05). Again, because the dependent variables in both cases do not display a 
normal distribution, we decided to conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The first test showed that 
pharmacists do not significantly report more medication incidents personally (Mean rank= 47.6) than 
non-pharmacists (Mean rank = 47.5, Z =-.01, p=0.995). The second test showed that pharmacists do 
not significantly report more medication incidents as a team or department (Mean rank= 46.8) than 
non-pharmacists (Mean rank = 47.6, Z =-.01, p=0.921). On the basis of these tests, we are forced to 
reject hypothesis eight. 
  
 4 Discussion 
 
4.1 Interpretation 
The MSCQ showed great internal consistency overall, and good internal consistency scores for the 
individual subscales. The only subscale to show poor internal consistency in the MSCQ is the 
management subscale. The most plausible explanation for the poor consistency of the management 
scale is that the institutions in which our respondents worked showed great variety in terms of 
management style. A large part of our respondents worked as nurses or caretakers, who often work 
independently. Especially geriatric nurses and caretakers that provide care at client’s homes are often 
used to working with little to no managerial oversight in the execution of their activities. As a result, 
we may expect a much smaller effect of managerial style on medication safety in these settings than 
in those with more direct oversight, such as in hospitals and pharmacies. This seems confirmed by the 
increased reliability of the management subscale in the MSCQ-2 after removing two questions, which 
measure the extent of direct managerial oversight. Management style is often considered one the 
most important aspects of safety culture in health care (Khatri, Brown & Hicks, 2009). The fact that the 
management scale performed poorly in the MSCQ and displayed low internal consistency suggests that 
the influence of management style on medication safety may be more dependent on the structure of 
a health care institution and the context within which care is provided than is generally assumed. 
Future research is needed to establish the effect of management style on safety culture in different 
healthcare settings.  
  The Confirmative Factor Analyses we conducted proved unable to confirm the factor structure 
of both the MSCQ and MSCQ-2. There are a few things that can be improved upon for future editions 
of the MSCQ, that will increase the likelihood of confirmation by CFA. Poorly performing questions may 
be looked at and improved upon if necessary. A useful strategy would be to look at the questions in 
the CFA with the largest variance in their estimates. Additionally, the addition of more questions to 
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some of the subscales may have a positive effect on the psychometric properties of the MSCQ as a 
whole as well. We have chosen to keep the number of questions for the MSCQ as low as possible, in 
order to ensure accurate answers and to prevent respondent fatigue. Fatigue among respondents can 
be a real problem for long questionnaires, introducing significant amounts of error in respondents’ 
responses (Hess, Hensher & Daly, 2012). Considering the fact that none of our respondents failed to 
finish the entire questionnaire, it seems there would be room to add additional questions to future 
versions of the MSCQ without causing significant fatigue in respondents.  
 Our research has shown that many medication incidents remain unreported to the CMR. Only 
55% of the incidents experienced by our respondents were reported to the CMR. The proportion of 
incidents reported within teams is even lower with 48.4%. Moreover, almost half of our respondents 
indicated never to have reported an incident to the CMR (45.7%), even though the vast majority of 
respondents indicated to have experienced medication incidents (90,7%). Teams and departments as 
a whole score lower, with over half of respondents indicating that to their knowledge, their team or 
does not report medication incidents to the CMR (54.3%), while medication incidents occurred in a 
reported 85.6% of teams and departments. What these figures show is that healthcare institutions 
report too few of their incidents to the CMR, meaning that valuable information that might lead to 
improvements in medication safety is lost.   
  These figures are likely to be an underestimation of the true number of incidents that remain 
unreported. In part, this is due to our answering range. For the questions about personal experiences, 
the answering range went from “Over the past five years, I have not experienced a medication 
incident/not reported a medication incident” to “More than ten times.” Questions about the reporting 
behavior of the team or department ranged from “As far as I know, my team almost never reports 
incidents to the CMR” to “More than ten times.” The fact that many respondents answered “more 
than ten times” for both personal experiences as well as for their team or department suggests that 
the high end of this range is probably too low. If anything, this means that if we would have used a 
wider response range, the proportion of incidents reported is likely to have been lower. For future 
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research, it seems advisable to extend the answering range, or to try an open answer response format. 
 Another reason why the figures we obtained may understate the proportion of incidents 
reported has to do with social desirability. Safety culture in general and medication safety in specific 
are highly sensitive topics for healthcare professionals, as it relates strongly to personal and 
professional ethics. As a result, research into safety culture is at risk of distortions in responses due to 
socially desirable answering. Especially the questions about the prevalence of medication incidents 
and the number of incidents reported seem vulnerable to social desirability, since the reporting of 
every incident clearly is the norm. As such, social desirability might cause respondents to overstate the 
proportion of incidents reported, even when responses are anonymous. There is a strong reason to 
believe that social desirability did indeed distort our respondent’s responses. Many respondents 
indicated that they had reported more medication incidents to the CMR than they had experienced. 
Technically speaking, this is possible for individual experiences, since in some teams one individual is 
responsible for filing all the incidents within their respective team or department. On the team level 
however, this is theoretically impossible, assuming that teams only report medication incidents that 
have actually occurred. The fact that many respondents claimed that their team reported more 
medication incidents than that had actually occurred therefore suggests that social desirability might 
have distorted our responses.  
 We were unable to use the Medication Safety Score and the CMR Checklist score as predictors 
for the number of incidents reported to the CMR. The reason for this seems to be that the figures for 
the number of incidents reported followed erratic distributions, both for the numbers reported for 
personal experiences and reports filed, as well as that for entire teams and departments. Reasons for 
this might be the aforementioned issues concerning social desirability and the answering scale used. 
Another explanation is that our respondents simply did not know the number of incidents that 
occurred and were reported. A central assumption of all self-report questionnaires is that people have 
reliable and accurate access to the information being asked. However, it may well be that healthcare 
professionals cannot provide an accurate estimate of the number of medication incidents that occur, 
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as well the number of incidents that they or their team report.  
  We also tested to see whether the CMR Checklist score is a good predictor for the Medication 
Safety Score. Improving efficiency is a constant concern for healthcare professionals and managers 
alike, so if a significantly shorter questionnaire could obtain results similar to that of the MSCQ, this 
can help save large amounts of time. The beta score we obtained through our regression analysis was 
slightly lower than what we deemed acceptable. However, it may still prove worthwhile to use the 
CMR Checklist to identify which institutions and healthcare employees can stand to improve their use 
of the CMR.    
  Finally, we also found that pharmacists and pharmacy assistants score significantly higher on 
the MSCQ and the CMR Checklist. This seems to suggest that pharmacy personnel has more knowledge 
of medication incident reporting than non-pharmacy personnel, which translates into higher 
Medication Safety Scores. Strikingly, we did not find significant differences between pharmacy and 
non-pharmacy personnel when it came to the number of reports filed, both individually as well as for 
teams or departments as a whole. Apparently, a higher awareness of the CMR and how to use it does 
not necessarily translate into more incidents being reported, which suggests that other factors play an 
important role as well.  
 
4.2 Limitations 
Several limitations to our study must be mentioned. First of all, our sample is probably not 
representative for the entire group of healthcare professionals in the Netherlands. Similarly, the 
majority of our respondents were female (83.5%). This percentage does not necessarily indicate a 
response bias caused by a gender effect. Rather, the majority of our respondents were either nurses 
or caretakers (75.3%); professions in which typically far more women than men are employed.   
 Secondly, because our research and questionnaire are geared towards the Dutch healthcare 
system, it may not be directly applicable to healthcare systems in different countries. Research 
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suggests culture plays a role in healthcare safety culture (Chen & Li, 2010). Furthermore, there are 
significant differences between countries in the organizational structure of health care institutions and 
reporting systems. Although the effect of these differences as of yet have hardly been investigated, it 
is likely they affect safety culture and reporting behavior.   
  A further limitation to our study is the limited number of pharmacists that participated. Despite 
our considerable outreach efforts, less pharmacists participated than we had hoped. This is a shame, 
because of all healthcare professionals it are pharmacists that work most closely with medication. It is 
advisable for future research aiming to work with pharmacists to try additional recruiting strategies, 
for example by offering a remuneration.   
  Finally, the aforementioned problem of social desirability is a further limitation to our study. 
Our study supports the conclusion that many medication incidents remain unreported. However, the 
true extent of this problem may be underestimated. Although social desirability is likely to remain a 
problem in research on medication safety and incident reporting, matching self-report figures with 
data about the reports that have actually been filed may provide a more accurate view.  
  
4.3 Implications 
Several implications follow from our study. First of all, our research confirms that a large number of 
medication incidents in the Netherlands remain unreported to the CMR. In this regard, there were 
large differences between healthcare institutions and departments, implying that reporting behavior 
is to a large extent influenced by the safety culture of departments. Secondly, we have tested and 
discussed the psychometric properties of the MSCQ. Although the MSCQ in its current form is not yet 
ready for widespread implementation, we do hope it can provide an impetus to the development of a 
medication safety questionnaire. Finally, we hope to have demonstrated the importance of an 
adequate medication safety culture in assuring patient safety. For too long, medication safety has been 
regarded as an subordinate aspect of the safety culture of healthcare institutions.  
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 Apendix A: Survey, including the MSCQ 
 
A.1 Questions about the CMR  
Incident Reporting & Incidence 
 
 
Sinds 2009 kunnen medicatie-incidenten worden gemeld bij de Centrale Medicatie-incidenten 
Registratie (CMR). Het doel van de CMR is om medicatie-incidenten te voorkomen en daarmee de 
patiëntveiligheid te vergroten. De volgende vragen gaan over uw persoonlijke gebruik van de CMR, 
en dat van uw team of afdeling. 
  
Hoe vaak heeft u de afgelopen vijf jaar een incident gemeld bij het CMR? 
    
Wanneer u korter dan vijf jaar met medicatie werkzaam bent, vragen wij u uw gemiddelde per jaar te 
vermenigvuldigen met vijf. (Q10) 
 
 
Hoe vaak heeft u de afgelopen vijf jaar een medicatie-incident meegemaakt? (Q12) 
 
Hoeveel keer per jaar doet uw team of afdeling een melding bij de CMR? (Q14) 
 
Hoeveel keer per jaar doet een medicatie-incident zich voor binnen uw team of afdeling? (Q15) 
 
 
A.2 CMR Checklist 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt veel aandacht besteedt aan medewerkers bekendmaken met de 
CMR. (Q16) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is voldoende kennis aanwezig om effectief gebruik te maken van de 
CMR. (Q18) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn alle medewerkers goed in staat om een medicatie-incident te 
herkennen. (Q19) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medewerkers 
voldoende op de hoogte gesteld van waar en hoe zij dit kunnen melden. (Q20) 
 
Als ik een medicatie-incident zou meemaken, weet ik niet goed hoe ik een melding moet maken bij 
de CMR. (Q21) 
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A.3 Medication Safety Culture Questionnaire 
Management 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is er ruimte om kritiek te leveren op de ideeën van het management. 
(Q23) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn er strikte procedures en richtlijnen die bepalen hoe er gewerkt 
dient te worden. (Q25) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling is er sprake van een sterke hiërarchie. (Q26)  
De leidinggevenden van mijn afdeling/team handelen integer. (Q27) 
Mijn leidinggevende(n) zijn goed benaderbaar voor vragen, suggesties en/of zorgen. (Q24) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling houden leidinggevenden strikt toezicht op de uitvoering van 
werkzaamheden. (Q28) 
 
Rapporteren (Reporting) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden de meeste medicatie-incidenten gemeld. (Q29)   
Mijn direct leidinggevende stimuleert me om medicatie-incidenten te melden. (Q31)  
Medicatie-incidenten die zich binnen mijn team/op mijn afdeling voordoen, worden door de 
betrokkene(n) zelf gemeld. (Q32) 
Medicatie-incidenten die zich binnen mijn team/op mijn afdeling voordoen, worden door anderen 
gemeld. (Q33) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden veel medicatie-incidenten niet gerapporteerd. (Q34) 
 
Openheid (Openness) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden zorgverleners voldoende op de hoogte gesteld wanneer 
medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen. (Q36) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling blijven we geïnformeerd over de afhandeling van gemelde medicatie-
incidenten. (Q38) 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling nemen betrokkenen 
de verantwoordelijkheid op zich. (Q39) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten openlijk besproken. (Q40) 
 
 
Zich uitspreken (Speaking Up) 
Ik doe regelmatig suggesties voor veranderingen om medicatie-incidenten te voorkomen. (Q42) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden weinig suggesties gedaan om medicatie-incidenten te 
voorkomen. (Q44) 
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In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt het gestimuleerd om zorgen en/of suggesties over de uitvoering 
van werkzaamheden te delen. (Q45) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt weinig gedaan met suggesties om medicatie-incidenten te 
voorkomen. (Q46) 
 
 
Eerlijkheid/rechtvaardigheid (Honesty/Justice) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden mensen die een medicatie-incident melden rechtvaardig 
behandeld. (Q47) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling krijgen medewerkers regelmatig de schuld van andermans fouten. 
(Q48) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling gelden voor iedereen dezelfde regels. (Q49) 
 
 
Angst/Vertrouwen (Fear/Trust) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling heerst een vertrouwenssfeer. (Q50) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt goed samengewerkt. (Q51) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling mogen fouten gemaakt worden. (Q52) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten niet gemeld uit angst voor eventuele 
negatieve gevolgen (Q53).  
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling ondersteunt men elkaar in het uitvoeren van de 
werkzaamheden. (Q54) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden erg hoge verwachtingen gesteld. (Q55) 
 
Person/System 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt ervan uitgegaan dat mensen feilbaar zijn en dat er fouten 
gemaakt kunnen worden. (Q56) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling word ik en/of mijn collega’s vaak beschuldigd van dingen zoals 
onoplettendheid, vergeetachtigheid en roekeloosheid. (Q57) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt de oorzaak 
gezocht in fouten in de procedures/beschermingsmaatregelen. (Q58) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden de 
werkomstandigheden sterk aangescherpt. (Q59) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt de oorzaak 
gezocht in fouten van en/of overtredingen door medewerkers. (Q60) 
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Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden de volgende 
maatregelen genomen: campagnes die angstgevoelens oproepen, disciplinaire maatregelen, 
omscholing, de schuld geven en/of dreigen met een rechtszaak. (Q61) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt er eerder gekeken 
naar waarom de procedures hebben gefaald dan naar wie er een steek heeft laten vallen. (Q62) 
 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden beschermingsmaatregelen genomen om het risico te 
verkleinen dat vergissingen, onoplettendheid en/of overtredingen van medewerkers tot medicatie-
incidenten leiden. (Q63) 
 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten optreden in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt er vanuit gegaan dat 
iemand van het personeel verantwoordelijk is. (Q64) 
 
Veiligheid (Committed to Safety) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling staat patiëntveiligheid hoog in het vaandel. (Q65) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt veel gedaan om de patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren. (Q67) 
Wanneer medewerkers in mijn team/op mijn afdeling hun werkzaamheden uitvoeren op een manier 
die ten koste gaat van de patiëntveiligheid worden zij hierop aangesproken. (Q69) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zou meer gedaan kunnen worden om de patiëntveiligheid te 
verbeteren. (Q70) 
 
Leren (Learning) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn we actief bezig om medicatie-incidenten te voorkomen. (Q71) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden medicatie-incidenten besproken om te voorkomen dat ze in de 
toekomst weer gebeuren. (Q72) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling hebben de evaluaties van eerdere medicatie-incidenten tot positieve 
veranderingen geleid. (Q73) 
Wanneer medicatie-incidenten zich voordoen in mijn team/op mijn afdeling wordt vaak 
oplossingsgericht gedacht. (Q77) 
  
 Appendix B: Script R 
 
Script R 
library(csv) 
library(lavaan) 
 
data <- read.csv("MSCQ 18-4 v5.csv",header=TRUE) 
 
#Define model with all latent variables (components) 
CFA.model <- 'Man =~ Q23+ Q24+ Q25+ Q26+ Q27+ Q28 
 Rep =~ Q29+ Q31+ Q32+ Q33+ Q34 
 Open =~ Q36+ Q38+ Q39+ Q40 
 Speak =~ Q42+ Q44+ Q45+ Q46 
 Fair =~ Q47+ Q48+ Q49 
 FT =~ Q50+ Q51+ Q52+ Q53+ Q54+ Q55 
 PS =~ Q56+ Q57+ Q58+ Q59+ Q60+ Q61+ Q62+ Q63+ Q64 
 Safe =~ Q65+ Q67+ Q69+ Q70 
 Lrn =~ Q71+ Q72+ Q73+ Q77' 
 
# Fit CFA model 
fit <- cfa(CFA.model, data = data) 
#summary(fit, fit.measures = TRUE) 
 
#---------------------------------------------------------- 
#Analysis with removed questions 
#---------------------------------------------------------- 
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CFA2.model <- 'Man =~ Q23+ Q24+ Q26+ Q27+Q70 
 Rep =~ Q29+ Q31+ Q32+ Q34 
 Open =~ Q36+ Q38+ Q39+ Q40 
 Speak =~ Q44+ Q45+ Q46 
 Fair =~ Q47+ Q48+ Q49 
 FT =~ Q50+ Q51+ Q52+ Q53+ Q54 
 PS =~ Q56+ Q57+ Q58+ Q61+ Q62+ Q63+ Q64 
 Safe =~ Q65+ Q67+ Q69 
 Lrn =~ Q71+ Q72+ Q73+ Q77' 
# Fit CFA model 
fit <- cfa(CFA2.model, data = data) 
#summary(fit, fit.measures = TRUE) 
 
